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Abstract: 
 
Indigenous peoples are among the most affected by environmental injustices globally, 
however environmental justice theory has not yet meaningfully addressed decolonization 
and the resistance of indigenous communities against extractivism in the settler-colonial 
context. This paper suggests that informing environmental justice through decolonial 
analysis and decolonizing practices can help transcend the Western ontological roots of 
environmental justice theories and inform a more radical and emancipatory 
environmental justice.  
 
The Unist'ot'en Resistance and Action Camp blocking pipelines in northwestern British 
Colombia, Canada, their “Reimagined Free Prior and Informed Consent protocol” and the 
Delgamuukw case are described to discuss limitations of the state and legal framework 
for accommodating a decolonial and transformative environmental justice. A decolonial 
analysis informed by these two moments of Wet’sewet’ten history suggest limits and 
adaptations to the trivalent EJ framework based on recognition, participation and 
distribution. It is argued that a decolonizing and transformative approach to 
environmental justice must be based on self-governing authority, relational ontologies of 
nature and epistemic justice and the unsettling of power through the assertion of 
responsibility and care through direct action.  
 
This discussion is placed in the context of the expansion of the concept of ecological 
rights, for example through the enshrining of the “Rights of Nature” in the constitutions 
of countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador, to highlight the inherent tensions in the 
translation of indigenous cosmo-visions into legal systems based on universalist values.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The Wet’suwet’en First Nation territory spans for over 22,000 km in NorthWest British 
Columbia, Canada, and lies directly in the path of several proposed gas and oil pipelines. 
Since 2010, the Unist'ot'en clan, members of the Wet'suwet'en Nation, have been 
reoccupying and re-establishing themselves on their ancestral lands in opposition to these 
projects. They have set up a camp on the GPS coordinates of the pipeline route as a way 
to impede the construction of any pipelines from crossing their territory, which they term 
as “occupied and un-ceded” as the tribe has never signed a treaty with the Government of 
Canada. 
 
This resistance is part of a long history of struggles for territorial self-determination. In 
1984, the Wet'suwet'en, together with the Gitksan, went to Court to assert their 
sovereignty, legal jurisdiction and aboriginal rights over the 58,000 square kilometres of 
their combined territory in British Colombia. The case eventually made it to the Supreme 
Court of Canada (Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 1997) and was a landmark in several 
respects. It established that the Tribe’s territorial sovereignty, pending proof of a 
surrender, by treaty, is a legitimate and outstanding constitutional question that still 
remains to be resolved by the Court. It was also significant as the first case that admitted 
oral histories as principal evidence. 
 
These two moments must be seen within a greater narrative of indigenous resurgence and 
affirmation in Canada that indigenous scholars such as Taiake (2005), Coulthard (2014) 
and Simpson (2011) have elaborated on and which engage with social theories of justice. 
In particular they attack the “politics of recognition” and reconciliation as a remedy for 
colonial injustices and call for radical alternatives to colonial structures as pathways 
towards decolonization. This paper aims to bring this literature into conversation with 
that on environmental justice, employing the struggle of the Wet'suwet'ten tribe for self-
determination and the transformative significance of the Unist'ot'en camp resistance as an 
informative case to probe some of the limits of EJ and social justice theory for a 
decolonial environmental justice. Through an analysis of the historical and current 
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struggle of the Wet’suwet’en it examines what happens when Western law clashes with 
indigenous law and cosmo visions in the courtroom, and in the territory and asks, what if 
environmental justice was to take decolonization seriously?  In doing so, it aims to 
advance both multidimensional theories of justice and the environmental justice 
literature. 
 
The potentialities and the limits to decolonizing environmental justice will be explored in 
this article through five moves. Following this first introductory section, the second 
section discusses methods and positionality, the third section reviews the literature on EJ 
and indigenous peoples and engages with Nancy Fraser's trivalent theory of justice and 
her distinction between affirmative and transformative remedies in conversation with 
other social justice theorists (Young 2011) and gives some background on the 
Wet’sewet’en and indigenous territorial perspectives.  The fourth section introduces the 
two case studies, initially examining the deployment of spatial tactics, direct action and 
performance in the Unist'ot'en camp as an example that transcends a state-centered and 
rights-based approach and secondly, the legal battle for recognition of territorial authority 
through the Delgamuukw court case as a means to trace the limits and potential of 
Western legal and political institutions to meeting indigenous demands.  
 
In the discussion, I propose three dimensions that can inform a decolonizing 
environmental justice.  I suggest that beyond distribution, participation and recognition, 
EJ must consider relational ontologies of nature, self-governing authority, and epistemic 
justice. The ideas developed contribute to the thorny questions of overlapping 
sovereignties, as well as broader questions over how relationships, ontologies and world-
views on nature can inform an ongoing transformation towards ecological and 
environmental justice.  
 
2. Methods and Positionality 
This work is part of a long history of scholar-activism around environmental justice 
issues, which includes the production of social justice documentary films, the creation of 
an online global atlas documenting resistance struggles globally and other journalistic 
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and academic work within a praxis that attempts to combines engaged scholarship and 
activism. As an expatriate settler-Canadian, this project also represented a re-encounter 
for me with my own role as a settler and a renewed engagement with indigenous 
solidarity work in Canada after many years living abroad, and thus entailed a process of 
“unsettling” myself within a space of solidarity described by Tuck and Yang (2012) as 
"an uneasy, reserved and unsettled matter that neither reconciles present grievances nor 
forecloses future conflict." 
 
Field work at the camp was carried out in the summer of 2014 while filming a social 
justice documentary film as a support and testimony for the camp. Five in-depth 
interviews were conducted with camp members and indigenous and settler activists at the 
camp. The resulting 20-minute film, Corridors of Resistance1, entailed minimal 
mediation so as to let the community speak for themselves.  It has been circulated, used at 
solidarity events and translated to Spanish. Publications, documents and declarations 
from the camp were analysed, as well as documents and legal articles on the 
Delgamuukw case and this material and the interviews were later coded and analyzed for 
key themes and concepts – including territory, justice, rights, and nature.  
 
Protocols followed included the reclaimed free prior and informed consent protocol 
designed by the Unist'ot'en as described in section four. This entailed an iterative process 
of questioning intentions, contributions and methods, repeated several times, first by 
email, upon arrival at the camp, and again during the process of drafting and reworking 
the text.  The work has been further informed by work on the decolonization of 
methodologies (Smith 2013) and by guidelines for “political rigour” and radical 
reflexivity being developed by a collective of scholars within the auspices of a large 
international project on trans-disciplinary research. Drafts of this article were shared and 
discussed with the camp members who provided critiques and feedback that were 
integrated into the text. This led to further questions from the camp and a process of 
reflexivity on the use of the work, intentions behind it, the perceived audience and how it 
                                                 
1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZDR1l_Xw7ts 
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would benefit their struggle. Beyond benefit to the camp, it is hoped that the 
documentation of this transformative praxis will serves to inform and inspire other 
struggles and that this paper and accompanying video and materials can contribute to 
networking and sharing knowledge between marginalized communities engaged in 
similar battles for environmental and social justice.  
 
3. Literature Review 
 
This work aims to disturb EJ literature by bringing it into conversation with 
epistemologies of the south, indigenous theorists and critical and indigenous legal 
studies.  Scholarship on environmental justice has expanded from its initial US roots and 
emphasis on the spatial distribution of toxics, to increasingly recognize multiple 
spatialities and dimensions of environmental justice (Walker 2009, Holifield, Porter and 
Walker 2009, Newell 2005).The literature has also expanded geographically and 
thematically to examine a range of issues and justice claims within trans-national and 
intergenerational perspectives (Sikor and Newell 2014; Chatterton, Featherstone and 
Routledge 2013; Schlosberg 2013). However, we may explore whether environmental 
justice theories are able to respond to the subordination of Indigenous normativities and 
whether they are compatible with a decolonizing politics of justice.  
 
This is important because Indigenous communities are at the forefront of struggles 
against land dispossession and environmental degradation globally. For example, in the 
Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (www.ejatlas.org) which documents 2500 cases of 
ecological conflicts, indigenous populations are present in 40% of cases (Temper et al 
2018). An emerging body of literature in EJ research grapples with the unique political 
and cultural dynamics of indigenous communities (Warner 2015. Whyte 2016, Westra 
2012; Vermeylen and Walker 2011) addressing issues such as collective claims to 
sovereignty; the need for new understandings of communal health and spiritual well-
being related to the loss of sacred and cultural resources (Ranco et. Al 2011); and the 
need for a community-based, capabilities-centered conception of environmental justice 
(Schlosberg and Carruthers 2010).  
6 
 
 
Scholars from a Latin American perspective have put forward the need for a decolonial 
environmental justice, often focusing on the need for inter-cultural communication 
(Rodriguez and Inturias 2018, Escobar), ontological politics (Blaser 2013, Escobar 2012) 
and the decolonization of knowledge and social relations. However, environmental 
justice literature in the Global North has engaged less with the colonial and epistemic 
roots of injustices, with some exceptions (Arn and Keeling 2009; Whyte 2016).  Whyte 
(2016:192) for example, describes indigenous environmental injustice as occurring 
“when one society robs another society of the institutional and ecological conditions 
required for members of another society to experience the world in ways 
that motivate their engagement in the operation of systems of responsibilities.” He 
suggests that such an indigenous conception of EJ serves to suggest very different 
solutions for remedying environmental injustices but does not clearly lay out what these 
are. This paper contributes to moving beyond colonial constructs in proposing remedies 
for environmental justice as experienced by indigenous communities.  
 
This paper thus explores the opportunities and limitations of environmental justice 
theories for transformative politics and decolonizing practice in the settler-colonial 
context. To do so we engage with the trivalent framework of justice (distribution, 
recognition and participation) first developed by Fraser (1995) and extended to EJ by 
Schlosberg (2007), which has become canonical in the literature. It provides a useful 
framework for examining how these dimensions address or fail to address the demands 
put forward by a decolonizing environmental justice perspective and what dimensions 
need to be included or adapted to lead to transformative change.  
 
3.1 Beyond Distribution, Recognition and Participation 
 
Fraser (1995) initially put forward a bivalent theory of justice, pointing out that claims 
for recognition of cultural difference and group identity was supplanting class interest 
and calls for socio-economic redistribution as the chief medium of political mobilisation. 
She argued that cultural domination and material inequality should be seen as analytically 
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distinct yet imbricated paradigms of injustice, with a dialectical relationship between 
them. Later, Fraser (2008) acknowledged the inadequacy of the binary 
recognition/distribution paradigm and added a third pillar -- “representation”, arguing 
that representation-related injustices driven by “political voice-lessness,” were becoming 
increasingly important in struggles for justice and democracy in a globalizing world and 
represent, through participation, the field of action upon which the other claims play out 
on.  
 
In Fraser’s view, the three types of injustices may be resolved in one of two ways: 
affirmatively or transformatively. Transformative remedies are associated with 
“correcting inequitable outcomes precisely by restructuring the underlying generative 
framework” (Fraser 2005:73), while affirmative remedies try to reduce inequalities 
without challenging the underlying social relations. 
 
For example, affirmative redistributive remedies correct income inequality by 
transferring material resources to the maligned groups, for example through the social 
welfare state. However, these remedies tend to leave intact the conditions, such as the 
capitalist mode of production, that were responsible for generating income inequality in 
the first place. In contrast, transformative redistributive remedies are aimed at eradicating 
the origins of economic injustice and eliminating the root causes of economic inequality. 
They would include the transformation of basic economic structures and reorganization 
of the division of labour (Fraser, 1995). 
 
In terms of ecological distribution (Martinez-Alier et al 2010), an EJ which aims for 
“equal rights and exposure to risk and pollution” such as the perspective advocated by the 
Environmental Protection Agency in the US is affirmative because it fails to explicitly 
demand a radical improvement in everyone’s treatment and to address the social, 
political, economic, and cultural forces that produce environmental pollution (Pellow 
2009). In contrast, the 17 principles of Environmental Justice declared by the First 
National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit which demands, among 
other things, “the cessation of the production of all toxins, hazardous wastes, and 
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radioactive materials, and that all past and current producers be held strictly accountable 
to the people for detoxification and the containment at the point of production,” 
(www.ejnet.org) represents a transformative remedy. 
 
Recognition is concerned with who is given respect and who is and is not valued, as well 
as questions such as “Who has standing? On what concerns? What are the legitimation 
processes by which social and symbolic meaning are attributed to these questions? What 
constitutes power, and what are the contexts with respect to those with power and those 
without?” (Agyeman et al. 2010; 8). Scholars have often highlighted the importance of 
the recognition paradigm as a way to understand the cultural impacts of indigenous 
environmental injustices (McGregor in Agyeman et al. 2010, Figueroa 2005, Porto and 
Pacheco 2009). However, recognition as an EJ issue is complicated as there are a range 
of claims regarding what should be recognized (Young 2011) as well as the contested 
meaning of recognition itself in practice, and the need for subjective experience therefore 
in defining it (Kompridis 2007).   
 
Recognition can refer to the need for the injustice or form of violence itself to be 
recognized as such, by both those who experience it, as well as by others (Young 2011).  
Claims for recognition have also been made for territorial sovereignty, for ecological 
integrity (Pimentel et al 2000, Neimanis et al 2012) and “the recognition that all aspects 
of Creation are interrelated” (McGregor 2010: 36). While some argue for the need to 
extend recognition and participation to nature itself (Schlosberg 2007), it has not been 
clearly delineated how this would operate in practice and how liberal conceptions of 
justice can be transcended to incorporate such broader understandings of recognition.  
 
A major gap in EJ literature on recognition concerns dominant conceptions of 
knowledge. This points to the absence of shared understandings of the grammar of 
justice, (the what, who and how) and acts as a fundamental impediment to 
operationalizing justice. This has been referred to as “epistemic justice” – which entails 
making visible and politically relevant ways of knowing that have been marginalized as a 
result of the imposition of a dominant knowledge system over others” (Widenhorn 2014; 
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380).  
 
Epistemic justice thus goes beyond procedural justice or participation as it entails 
defining the concepts and problems themselves and reminds us that knowledge itself is 
not neutral or objective but connected to power and must be seen through a historically 
distinct analysis to be understood.   For example, liberal notions of justice and the legal 
system, are founded on “universal access” to rights grounded in a western knowledge 
system based on “objective” knowledge. However, these rights are linked to a specific 
understanding of the `good life’, freedom and happiness, and can close off other 
understandings and related emancipatory possibilities. 
 
The epistemic and ontological violence perpetrated against non-occidental 
cultures operates such that even where the physical control of territories has ended, the 
cultural logic of colonialism still operates, and silences other ways of doing, being and 
knowing (Mignolo 2007; Escobar 2016; Maldonado-Torres 2007). Santos et al. (2007) 
call this the ‘coloniality of knowledge’: the hegemonic conception of modern scientific 
knowledge. Epistemic justice thus takes two main forms: testimonial and hermeneutical 
(Fricker 2007). Testimonial injustice occurs when a hearer discounts the credibility of a 
person’s testimony on account of their social identity. Hermeneutical injustice arises 
when society lacks the interpretative resources to make sense of a speaker’s experience, 
because that speaker has been marginalised in meaning-making activities. As Vermeylen 
(2013) highlights, stories and narrative are dialectic processes, imparted in a context of a 
transforming relationship between the elicitor and the narrator, the success of which will 
depend on the hearer’s capacity and willingness to understand and respond to the validity 
claims raised.  
 
As regards recognition, Fraser (1995) associates affirmative remedies with “mainstream 
multi-culturalism[...]which aims to redress disrespect while leaving intact both the 
contents of those identities and the group differentiations that underlie them”. In contrast 
she associates transformative remedies with deconstruction and redressing disrespect by 
transforming the underlying cultural-valuational structure. For example, she uses the 
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example of “queer politics” to explain how by destabilising existing group identities and 
differentiations, such as the homo/hetero binary, such remedies not only raise the self-
esteem of members of currently disrespected groups, they change everyone’s sense of 
self.  
 
Finally, for Fraser, the normative foundation of justice is participation equality. 
According to this norm, justice requires a social arrangement that permit all (adult) 
members of society to interact with one another as peers (Fraser 2003, p.36).  Fraser 
advocates for “a politics aimed at overcoming subordination by establishing the mis-
recognized party as a full member of society, capable of participating on a par with the 
rest.” This entails representation so as to overcome barriers to political participation. 
 
Potentially more relevant to indigenous peoples claiming sovereignty is what Fraser 
refers to “misframing”, or meta-political injustice which result due to issues with the 
(geographical) scales which delimit the bounds of justice and to “the division of political 
space into bounded polities” that are drawn in such a way as to wrongly deny some 
people the chance to participate at all in its authorized contests over justice” (Fraser 
2008:408). Yet her focus here remains on the global poor and those who are stateless. 
She does not address specifically the case of those who oppression is tied to the existence 
of the state itself.  
 
This brief review, by bringing EJ into conversation with indigenous scholarship and 
perspectives on nature and territory, suggests the need to revise several widely held tenets 
within environmental justice theories and test their adequacy for settler-colonial contexts. 
The first is that the rights paradigm (and the legal arena) is the appropriate mechanism for 
seeking remedy for environmental justice (Gonzales 2013).  Another is the assumption 
that a politics of recognition (directed towards the state) is a necessary and sometimes 
sufficient pre-condition to participatory and distributive environmental injustice (Turner 
2006; Whyte 2011). Third is the universalist assumptions that inform political philosophy 
on environmental justice.  
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The following sections presents the ontologies of nature and territory of the Wet´sewet´en 
and their engagements with the state and the legal regime to inform the discussion on 
how EJ can more meaningfully address these issues.  
 
3.2 Background – Visions of territory and governance of the Wet’sewet’en 
 
The Wet’sewet’en are an Athapaskan culture related to inland Carrier groups, and the 
name Wet’sewet’en (Witsuwit’en) means “the people of the lower drainage” referring to 
their occupation on the tributaries of the Skeena River in the Bulkley Morice Watershed 
(Mills 1994, 37).  The Wet’suwet’en people are governed by two primary systems: a 
hereditary system (represented by the Office of the Wet’suwet’en) composed of 5 clans: 
Gilseyhu (Big Frog), Laksilyu (Small Frog), Gitdumden (Wolf/Bear), Laksamshu 
(Fireweed) and Tsayu (Beaver clan). As well as a band-level system which consists of six 
bands (Moricetown Band, Burns Lake Band, Hagwilget Village Council, Nee Thai Buhn 
Band, Skin Tyee Nation, and Wet’suwet’en First Nation). The Unist’ot’en are members 
of the Gilseyhu (Big Frog Clan) and Moricetown band.2 
 
The Wet’suwet’en are a matrilineal society whereby clans are further divided into kin-
based groups known as Yikhs, often referred to as house groups, which function 
autonomously and have jurisdiction over their house territory. For the Wet’suwet’en, this 
jurisdiction is considered a responsibility rather than a right, with the hereditary chiefs 
entrusted with stewarding and caretaking the territory to ensure it will continue to 
produce game, fish, berries, and medicines to support the subsistence, trade, and 
customary needs of house members (Mills 1994; Mills and Overstall 1996). The 
                                                 
2 The council system was set up with the Indian act of 1876 to govern the reserves. The Unist’ot’en clan repudiates their authority, 
and while Delgamuukw affirms the traditional system of hereditary chiefs as those who can take decisions over the Wet’suwet’en 
territories, energy companies often negotiate with band councils even though they don’t have the power to consent to development 
projects beyond the reserves. For example, Chevron has formed The First Nations Limited Partnership (http://bcfnlp.ca/ ) with band 
councils as the basis for an agreement on PTP. On Jan. 23, 2015, the Moricetown band became the 16th band along the pipeline route 
to sign on to the partnership. Touted as a “$500 million + commercial partnership by and for First Nations”, the 16 bands will share 32 
million Canadian dollars (U.S. $24.6 million) once construction begins, as well as $CA 10 million ($7.7 million) per year while the 
pipeline is operating. Meanwhile on August 6, 2015, all five Unist’ot’en chiefs, along with four other Wet’suwet’en chiefs, signed 
the Unist’ot’en Declaration declaring that the land was unceded and that their consent was needed for any project on their territory.  
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responsibilities of the chief to manage and harvest resources are validated through the 
feast system, the central governance institution of the Wet’suwet’en (Mills 1994). “It is in 
the feast that people are given their titles, their robes and their crests and the authority 
over the territory associated with those titles.”  
  
Similar to many First Nations in British Colombia, the Wet’suwet’en have never signed a 
treaty with Canada and this means their territory remains unceded. In the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763, King George III declared that title to Indian territory was not to be 
considered extinguished or transferred merely by conquest or occupation but only 
through voluntary cession. This Proclamation retains the status of constitutional law in 
Canada and means that the land title question for First Nations in B.C remains to be 
settled.  
  
However, the territorial question brings to the fore the profound difference in vision 
between indigenous territorial relations and state forms of property (Thom 2014). 
Indigenous notions of territoriality unsettle the concept of territory in geography, which 
has recently been a focus of analysis (Painter 2010) and has been conceptualized as a 
“political technology” for the occupation and control of space and exercise of state power 
(Elden 2013).  Such a conception does not account for the diversity of indigenous 
relationships between people and place. The disruption of indigenous relationships to 
land and the “epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence” continually re-asserted 
through colonization as land is remade into property (Tuck and Wang 2012, 5) is the 
cornerstone of the ongoing processes and structure of settler-colonialism.  
 
Conversely, decolonization entails the reclamation of such relationships and the actual 
repatriation/unsettling of land. As Simpson (2014) asserts for the Mohawk “Their own 
object was and is territory in a material sense, their land—but also ideas, the past, the 
present, the future, their membership within the polity itself.” Similarly, political 
ecologists in Latin America describe how the “territorial question” is being debated and 
inscribed in a tense political process as the confrontation of power strategies for the 
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appropriation of nature3 (Porto-Gonçalves, 2004). They point to how cultural rights 
guide these processes of re-territorialization, leading to new material and symbolic forms 
of appropriation of nature and new meanings that stem from the local cosmogonies and 
socio-economic practices. Under this light, the territory is redefined as the summa of 
nature/culture power relations. Such contrasting ontological understandings of territory 
raise considerable challenges on how territorial jurisdiction with the state can be 
negotiated, without abstracting and articulating indigenous perspectives in a way that 
erases them, as we shall address in the next section.  
 
4. The politics of indigenous pipeline resistance 
 
4.1 The Unist'ot'en “checkpoint” 
“We will not remove our Gateway (not a blockade). A gateway into understanding truth 
and meaningful decolonization.”   
- Unist’ot’en Camp 
 
The first confrontation of the Unist’ot’en Clan with the Pacific Trails Pipeline (PTP) 
natural gas pipeline dates from November 2011 when camp members escorted drillers 
and other PTP employees off their territories. Hereditary Chief Toghestiy again evicted 
surveyors from their territory on 20 November 2012, by presenting them with an eagle 
feather, the first and only traditional notice of trespass. The surveyors were ordered to 
leave the territory and the road entering into the territory was been closed to all industry 
activities. 
 
On 27 November 2012, solidarity protests for the camp and against fracking were held in 
13 cities, from California to Toronto and across British Colombia, and representatives of 
the Wet’suwet’en delivered eviction notices to Apache Oil and Enbridge stating that the 
companies “are not permitted onto unceded lands of the Wet’suwet’en; are not permitted 
                                                 
3 This is perhaps best expressed in the words of the seringeuros of Brazil, quoted  bv Porto-Goncalves:“nosotros no 
queremos tierra, nosotros queremos territorio”. We don’t want the land – we want the territory.   
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to place their greed ahead of Indigenous self-determination; are not permitted to destroy 
and exploit the lands; are not permitted to disregard the safety and health of 
communities;[and] are not permitted to disregard [our] Law!” Freda Huson, 
spokeswoman for the clan, had written a letter “To the illegitimate colonial governments 
of Canada and British Columbia, and to all parties involved in the proposed PTP project 
that stated “This letter is to issue a warning of trespass to those companies associated 
with the PTP industrial extraction project and against any affiliates and contractors 
infringing upon traditional Wet’suwet’en territory...any further incursion into their 
territory [will be interpreted]as an act of aggression against their sovereignty and that 
violators will be held accountable.”  
 
Following this, the first cabin of the camp, home of Freda Huson, a member of the 
Unist’ot’en house of the Gilseyhu, (Big Frog) clan, and her husband Toghestiy, of the 
nearby Likhts’amisyu (Fireweed) clan, was built directly on the GPS coordinates of the 
proposed route of the Pacific Trails Pipeline (PTP), which they refer to as “the trailblazer 
of the prospective energy corridor”.   
 
The struggle of the Unist'ot'en must be seen in a broader context of politics of resistance 
against pipeline projects in Canada and in British Colombia led by First Nations (Scott 
2013, McCreary and Milligan 2014). The Unist'ot'en are one node in a networked 
resistance movement opposing these pipelines, petro-infrastructure and “fossil 
capitalism” in Canada composed of environmental organizations, affected citizens and 
First Nations (Scott 2013).  These struggles, fought on many fronts, including in the 
courts, through legislative means, in the streets and on the land, are claiming victories. 
The most recent being the cancellation of the Enbridge pipeline after the courts ruled that 
the government failed in upholding its constitutional duty to consult First Nations who 
would be affected by the pipeline. 
 
Considerable geo-political stakes and multi-billion dollar investments are at play here, as 
pipeline infrastructure is key to Canadian Government and industry plans to unlock the 
vast energy resources in the Alberta tar sands and the fracking fields in North Eastern 
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British Columbia (BC) and deliver them to global markets through ports in Kitimat and 
Prince Rupert on BC’s West coast.  This is part of plans on the part of the province of BC 
to become a major exporter of shale gas from Hydraulic Fracturing fields in the Horn 
area of British Colombia through a liquified natural gas (LNG) economic strategy 
estimated to be worth some US $78 billion.  On the line are billions of dollars and 19 
LNG projects, including five natural gas pipelines, and three LNG facilities planned to be 
in operation by 2020. These projects make up what has been termed a planned ‘energy 
corridor’, designed ultimately to unlock the tar sands and allow them to be marketed 
globally without first passing through the US (McCreary and Milligan 2014).  
 
While the Enbridge oil pipeline has generated heated opposition from many of the 50 
indigenous territories whose lands it would cross, opposition to “natural” gas pipelines 
has generally been more muted. This may be partly because their concerns regarding the 
distribution of risk has been assuaged as many communities are told that in case of a spill 
the gas would simply evaporate.  In contrast, the position of the Unist'ot'en camp is 
counter to a NIMBY approach that transcends concerns for distributive impacts on their 
territory alone (Neville and Weinthall 2016). According to them, their resistance is in 
solidarity with communities in the North-East of the province where the extraction would 
take place, coastal communities impacted by export terminals, as well as communities 
from the tar sands, as well as other marginalized communities impacted by climate 
change. Further, they see the defense of territory within a broader process of healing the 
trauma of colonization for indigenous peoples within Canada and within a broader global 
perspective, as described further in section 5. This positioning and their complete 
opposition to all pipelines - existing, proposed or approved to expand - means the camp 
has wide support, and has become a symbol against extractivism (Acosta 2013). 
 
The camp’s presence seems to have contributed to several significant victories in terms of 
discouraging investment with up to 5 of 7 proposed pipeline projects being canceled or 
on hold as of October 2017. The PTP project was initially shared by EOG Resources, 
Encana Corp., and majority owner Apache corp. of Houston, Texas. In 2013, EOG and 
Encana sold their shares in the project to Chevron Canada, a subsidiary of Chevron 
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Corporation, which moved into a 50% ownership position along with Apache.  In 2014, 
Apache also pulled out and PTP is currently on hold as Chevron does not have a new 
partner and the project does not have Asian buyers lined up. This recent withdrawal of 
Apache was heralded as their victory on the Unist’ot’en website, feting that all of the 
original investors (Encana, EOG and now Apache) have now bailed on the project. 
Several competing projects are still in the “pipeline” and trying to gain access to the 
territory– foremost among these is Coastal Gaslink, a 650km natural gas pipeline that 
TransCanada is building connected to the CA$12 billion "LNG Canada" terminal in 
Kitimat, in parntnership with Shell, PetroChina, Korea Gas and Mitsubishi.  
 
4.2 Reimagined Free Prior and Informed Consent 
 
The checkpoint in the Unist'ot'en camp is controlled via a wooden bridge bridge across 
the Wedzin Kwah (Morice River), 66 kilometers up a logging road from Houston, British 
Columbia. This river serves as a border between Canada and the traditional territory of 
the Unist’ot’en. The blockade is marked by a large, painted-plywood sign that reads 
“STOP. No access without prior consent”.  
 
To cross the bridge and enter the camp, every person who enters must go through a 
“Reimagined Free Prior and Informed Consent (RFPIC)” protocol that has been 
established by the Unist'ot'en camp collective. According to the Unistot'en website “In 
ancient times and even today…  in community resistance building gatherings, there exists 
Protocols where visiting peoples have shown who they are in relation to asking 
permission to enter the Traditional Lands from the Traditional Chiefs and Matriarchs of 
the hosting lands.” (Unist’ot’en ND) 
 
The protocol entails five questions that are sent to visitors when they give advance notice 
of their arrival. 
 
1. Who are you? 
2. Where are you from? 
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3. What is your purpose in coming here? 
4. Do you work for Industry or Government that is destroying our lands. 
5. How will your visit benefit the Unist’ot’en people? 
According to the camp members, the RFPIC should be seen as an act of reclamation of 
the FPIC process that has been “taken... strangle hold by the Corporations, NGO’s, 
Governments and other Colonial Bodies” (Unist’ot’en ND).  This is because FPIC is 
increasingly used as a mechanism to facilitate and legitimate development projects 
“where the ‘C’ in FPIC is increasingly redefined as ‘consultation’, precisely because the 
principle of consent, if taken seriously, does imply the right to say ‘no’ and the power to 
veto.” (Franco 2014) Counter to this appropriation, the Unist'ot'en claim that it is not a 
new process but based on Traditional Laws that were asserted via protocols like this on 
the lands for thousands of years.  
The Wet’suwet’en also had to present themselves as such when 
travelling to neighbouring peoples’ lands to conduct trade, 
protocols, build and maintain peace, assist with allies’ battles, 
and attain resources or trade work. Visiting nations would be 
required to dance their stories to show to the host nations that 
they truly are who they say they are (as the dance would have 
been seen through historical trade relations). (Unist’ot’en ND) 
 
In this way, the RFPIC is a living breathing (re)assertion of the Traditional Laws of the 
Wet’suwet’en.  According to their website (Unist’ot’en ND); “Free Prior and Informed 
Consent is not gone, lost or eroded. It has been asleep. The knowledge of conducting 
them is still active. It must be asserted by the Indigenous Peoples’ of these lands. It is not 
a mere document at the UN office awaiting to be implemented by statism. It is living 
breathing protocols that must be asserted by peoples who live off the land, connecting to 
the spirit of the ancestors and upholding Natural Laws.” 
 
The RFPIC protocol is part of a long history of occupation through physical means, 
through the use of checkpoints and controls, which has been a feature of cultural norms 
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and values for First Nations in Canada for a long time (Borrows 2005). The checkpoint or 
blockade is a spatial tactic of direct action resistance, that is both instrumental as well as 
symbolic.  Instrumentally, “The blockade is … used to regulate movement where 
movement itself is in dispute.  Blockade is frequently seen as a means of physically 
halting “the massive and unsustainable out-movement of capital and commodities from 
traditional territories” (Blomley 1996, 14). Blockades are particularly effective in this 
regard in Canada (Wilkes et al 2010) due to the particular geography of colonization in 
Canada, whereby its low-density population and rugged terrain mean that pockets of 
unprocessed resources such as timber or metals are hauled out long distances over few 
transport connections (Blomley 1996).  First Nations territories maintain privileged 
access to these arteries of economic flows and exercise incredible leverage to put at risk 
the “critical infrastructure” that transports natural resources and manufactured goods 
from mines, oil fields, hydro-electric facilities and factories to international markets 
(Pasternak 2013). The assertion of territorial control that disrupt capitalist extractivist 
activities should also be seen as a struggle against the extractivist model itself.  
 
Blomley (p.14) argues, that blocking the flow of resources is what invests the blockade 
with its tremendous strategic power and that the blockade also holds a symbolic effect “to 
the extent that it marks out two spaces...  (mapping) out a boundary and, in so doing, 
distinguishes an "Indian" space from a "Euro-Canadian" space.”  This demarcation is an 
act of defiance, yet beyond the disruption of the flows of capitalism and the denial of the 
movement of resources out of the territory, the blockade can (temporarily in most cases 
but in some cases for extended periods) create a space for the control and practice of 
indigenous economic and political authority in the face of the cultural and economic 
dislocation forced upon them. In the case of the Unist'ot'en it has enabled the creation of a 
'safe haven' (Anguelovski 2013) where they may enact their shared aspirations and 
identity, and assert their sovereignty over their lands.  
 
The process of RFPIC as enacted in the camp should also be considered what Kennedy 
(2002), a legal scholar critical of rights-based approaches, has described as the disruption 
of the oppressive exercise of legal power through engaging in a series of small scale, ad 
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hoc transgressive performances, in an attempt to subvert or dismantle existing social 
structures (Kennedy 2002). This form of “tactical guerrilla warfare” at the same time 
opens pathways to indigenous affirmation and “self-recognition”. It forecloses the 
continual expansion of state authority to designate specifically bounded forms of 
Indigeneity, opening up new “indigenous ways of becoming”.  
 
Moreover, the assertion of unilateral sovereignty that the RFPIC entails redraws the 
frames of representation – in this case shifting the “who” in the case of who is the 
sovereign who is granting recognition/access to the territory. By establishing consensual 
relations on their own terms, the RFPIC stakes out a space for political sovereignty 
defined by their own legal interpretations and authority. This process of assertion of 
sovereignty thus offers a more transformative remedy to the marginalization of 
indigenous peoples and perspectives than the participatory parity offered by Fraser. We 
return to this in the discussion.  
 
Finally, the RFPIC questions the ontology of what consent is and posits it as a process 
that each community must construct. In this way, they address the procedural questions 
of justice  - what consent is and what it means and the need for the community itself to 
define consent.  
 
4.3 Delgamuukw and the Legal approach 
 
We are not interested in asserting aboriginal rights. We are here to discuss territory and 
authority. When this case ends and the package has been unwrapped, it will have to be 
our ownership and our jurisdiction under our law that is on the table.  
 
– Delgam Uukw 
 
The resistance of the Unist'ot'en needs to be seen within a long history of creative 
resistance of the Wet'suwet'en against colonialism. Along with the Gitxsan First Nation 
they blockaded logging in their traditional territory in the late 1980s, an action which 
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culminated in the groundbreaking Delgamuukw court case whereby in 1984, the Gitksan-
Wet'suwet'en went to Court to assert their sovereignty, legal jurisdiction and aboriginal 
rights over some 58,000 square kilometres of their territory in British Colombia (Borrows 
1999). 
 
In Delgamuukw, the Gitxsan and Wetsuwet’en demanded recognition of their 
unextinguished jurisdiction over the land. This claim was based on the fact that they had 
never signed any land treaties with the governments of Canada and therefore that they 
had never ceded title to their traditional territories as per the Royal Proclamation of 
17634. In the absence of a ratified treaty and having never been conquered in war, the 
Gitxsan and Wetsuwet’en thus retained title and jurisdiction over their land, according to 
Canadian law.  
Begun in 1984, the case first went before the Supreme Court of British Columbia in 1987 
(Delgamuukw: SCBC), where it was dismissed by Chief Justice Allan McEachern in 
1991. The ruling was then appealed in the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
(Delgamuukw: BCCA) and eventually went to the Supreme Court of Canada 
(Delgamuukw: SCR). The final decision was handed down by Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Antonio Lamer in 1997 and is considered a landmark ruling for Indigenous land 
claims. Despite its very qualified affirmation and diverging views on what was 
accomplished (Borrows 1999, Pasternak 2014, Napoleon 2005), it established that the 
Tribe’s territorial sovereignty, pending proof of surrender, by treaty, is a legitimate and 
outstanding constitutional question that still remains to be resolved by the court. 
Perhaps the most significant outcome of the case was that after initial objections, the 
Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en were able to use their oral histories as principal evidence in the 
case. In order to demonstrate their “long-time use, occupation, possession and 
administration” of the contested land, they relied on “tremendous quantities of intensely 
detailed evidence of their languages, genealogies, customs and oral histories,” which 
                                                 
4 The force and legitimacy of the Royal Proclamation had just recently been re-affirmed by its incorporation into section 35 the 
Canadian constitution in 1982.  
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demonstrated their deep and enduring social, cultural and historical connections to their 
territory (Daly 2007; Vermeylen 2013). 
In the case of the Wet’suwet’en, the oral history is transmitted through the “Kungax”, a 
spiritual song or dance or performance where the “recital[s] of the most important laws, 
history, traditions and traditional territory of a House...is repeated, performed and 
authenticated at important feasts.” In the case of the Gitksan, it is through the adaawk. It 
was in the feast hall where for millennia they would tell and retell their stories, pass on 
important histories, songs, crests, lands, ranks, and properties from one generation to the 
next, and identify their territories to remind themselves of the sacred connection that they 
have with their lands. (Napoleon 2013, Borrows 1999) 
 
Richard Overstall (2004) explains how in the case of the Gitsxan, these histories serve as 
an embedded law that evolved as the result of people observing the consequences of their 
behaviour over time. Behaviour that was disrespectful of spirits, animals, and the others, 
and the consequences of it were recorded in adaawk, especially if the behaviour alters a 
lineage’s relationship with its territory. The adaawk thus served as legal precedents to 
inform later conduct. 
 
The plaintiffs argued that understanding the Gitxsan and Wetsuwet’en argument for 
jurisdiction requires an understanding of their cultures’ views of the world through these 
oral histories. While property does exist in Gitxsan and Wetsuwet’en culture, it is 
expressed in terms that may be lost in translation for an observer not intimate with the 
territory. These histories lay out a series of relationships with the territory, rather that one 
of simple ownership as understood by Western property rights. Aboriginal property rights 
concern use, not exploitation or extraction (Mills 2010). As she explains: “The 
Witsuwit’en believe that people may kill the animals as long as they treat them with 
respect. If they do not, the animals will not reincarnate or allow people to take them 
(Mills; 1994; 157).” Laws laid down in the Kungax and the Adaawk also record when 
houses can pick berries, fish, among others. (Morden 2015) 
 
By creating a space within the court-room where indigenous narratives were able to gain 
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equal legitimacy to settler narratives, through the use of their traditional spellings, regalia 
and songs, the Delgamuukw trial served to deconstruct the courtroom in a performative 
way, recreating and redraw the boundaries of the colonial system that is the court-room 
(Napoleon 2013, Borrows 1999).  In this way, the Delgamuukw trial served as a 
transformative vehicle for cultural politics and opened up a space for decolonizing 
practices (Mills 1994). At the same time, it also revealed some of the limitations of the 
formal justice system as regards the recognition of indigenous sovereignty as well as the 
recognition of a relational ontology with nature as the next section argues.  
 
5. Discussion - Unsettling environmental justice 
 
This paper aims to contribute to a disturbance of Western ontologies and epistemologies 
of Environmental Justice with the aim of charting more emancipatory futures. While the 
theories of EJ proposed by Schlosberg and Fraser have made tremendous contributions 
towards a more pluralist understanding of justice; such frameworks in their attempt to be 
inclusive and universal can also lead to foreclosing other understandings of what justice 
is, who the subjects of justice should be and how it should be delivered.  
 
A decolonial analysis informed by the two moments of Wet’sewet’ten history explored 
here suggest limits and adaptations to the trivalent framework based on recognition, 
participation and distribution. I propose three pillars of a de-colonial environmental 
justice. I argue that rather than simply participation, justice must include self-governing 
authority; that rather than distribution (of nature), environmental justice calls for breaking 
down the dualism between humans and nature, and beyond recognition, what is needed is 
epistemic justice and self-affirmation. I question the capacity of the state and legal 
framework for accommodating such a decolonial and transformative environmental 
justice and instead propose that direct action, and assertion of responsibility and care may 
serve as more effective tools of resistance.  
 
These insights are not only relevant for an environmental justice that takes decolonization 
and the claims of indigenous peoples seriously but can also contribute towards a more 
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radical and potentially emancipatory environmental justice that can inform struggles, help 
hone tools of resistance and transformatively rethink human-nature relationships.  
 
5.1 Beyond Participation --- Self-governing authority 
 
The standard narrative in EJ is that justice requires fair and meaningful participation by 
those affected. For Fraser (2008) this entails the need for “participatory parity” – which 
entails inclusion of all “subjects of justice” understood as those jointly subjected to a 
structure of governance, which sets the ground rules that govern their interaction.  (Fraser 
2008; 65). 
 
Participatory parity therefore primarily concerns itself with how to build inclusion within 
existing governance structures. Fraser’s theory contains important elements of reflexive 
openness which allows discussion around who the subjects of justice are in each context. 
However the framework is still rooted in Western thought and experience and is designed 
to deal primarily with claims of exclusion - those where the denial of participation is the 
main complaint. It is a less appropriate fit for the settler-colonial context, whereby the 
problem is precisely that indigenous peoples have to address their claims within a 
sovereignty they do not recognize. Rather than participation, what they are seeking is 
political and social exemption. They are not seeking participation but recognition of their 
sovereignty and their self-governing authority. Westra (1999) thus differentiates between 
black communities in the US who demanded an end to segregation as a result of being 
forcibly excluded from society – to be treated as equals – and aboriginal peoples in 
Canada who have been forcibly included and assimilated into society through 
discriminatory laws. In this case, she argues, granting rights is not only insufficient, but 
simply wrong.  
 
The limits to participatory parity are well demonstrated by the Delgamuukw case where 
the state framework was unable to provide a mechanism for resolving the demand for 
indigenous self-determination. As Coulthard (2014: 36) argues, the settler state does not 
constitute a legitimate framework within which indigenous peoples may be more justly 
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included. Instead, the Delgamuukw case brought into question the court’s very authority. 
Borrows (1999) refers to this as “Sovereignty's Alchemy”, asking “What alchemy 
transmutes the basis of Aboriginal possession into the golden bedrock of Crown title?” 
(p. 558), referring to the fact that the underlying injustice is the assumption of the 
sovereign power as the foundation of the legal order itself (Muldoon 2015).  As 
Coulthard (2014; 36) argues; participation within the Canadian legal system leaves intact 
two primary features of colonial domination that indigenous assertions of nationhood call 
into question: the legitimacy of the settler state's claim to sovereignty over their territories 
and the normative status of the state-form as an appropriate mode of governance on the 
other.  
 
Instead of participation and inclusion, justice for occupied and indigenous peoples calls 
for interrogating the mapping of political space and inclusion within the frame of the 
territorial state itself. The terms of participation, and the subjects of justice are mis-
framed. This implies the need to decolonize law and to deconstruct the state’s grounds to 
inaugurate law on lands acquired through colonial settlement (Pasternak 2014). It also 
calls for decolonizing participatory parity, which entails reframing and questioning the 
authority of the state itself as the governance framework and looking beyond standard 
liberal frames of justice to acknowledge that the existing international system of nation-
states cannot meet indigenous demands for self-determination, and that a commitment to 
justice for indigenous peoples may entail calling those state-systems into question 
(Young 2000). Because the state is often the key actor pushing extractive projects, 
decentering the state and envisioning governance beyond its confines is an important 
contribution from indigenous thought that can productively unsettle EJ. 
 
5.2 Beyond Distribution --- Destabilization of the human / nature dualism 
Environmental justice from the outset was concerned with the distribution of 
environmental resources and burdens. This perspective relies on a conception of nature as 
a passive object that can be more justly and equitatively distributed among human 
populations through different property rights, allocations, etc.  Such a perspective on 
distribution is incompatible with indigenous conceptions of nature and on human-
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ecological relationships that call into question the view of the environment as a 
commodity that can be owned or traded.  
 
The Wet’suwet’en and Gitxsan cosmology views humans as being fundamentally 
interconnected with their ecology. The plaintiffs, Gisday Wa and Delgam Uukw, describe 
in their opening address a view that understands the world to be a differentiated unity, of 
which humans are only one part. There is no strict human/ nature dualism in this view 
(Wa and Uukw 1992). They wrote: “The Western world-view sees the essential and 
primary interactions as being those between human beings. To the Gitksan and 
Wet’suwet’en, human beings are part of an interacting continuum, which includes 
animals and spirits. Animals and fish are viewed as members of societies, which have 
intelligence and power, and can influence the course of events in terms of their 
interrelationship with human beings.” 
 
This relational perspective on nature sees human and non-human living beings as well as 
inanimate objects, within a matrix of relations, “backward and forward in time, laterally 
in the present” (Kneen 2015, 33). A relational ontology, summed up by the indigenous 
prayer phrase “All my relations” restores agency and subjectivity to nature. In indigenous 
legal tradition it is often expressed as “natural law”: laws that are in keeping with the 
laws of the natural world (Westra 2012). According to natural law, relationships with 
nature are what define one’s responsibilities to them. Thus instead of distribution of 
nature, the emphasis is on the mutual relations based on reciprocity and care.  
 
Such an understanding of nature is extremely difficult to integrate into Western legal 
institutions for delivering environmental justice. The natural law of indigenous legal 
tradition, as well as Western law, are both based on a worldview and an understanding of 
how humans are (e.g., individual, competitive, communal, etc.) and how they relate to the 
larger world, as well as to non-human life forms (Napoleon 2013). The testimony of 
Delga Uukw and Nisgay Wa Uukw in the Delgamuukw case aimed to unsettle the 
Western idea of ownership and jurisdiction over land and resources (Bryan 2000) and 
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demanded a destabilizing of the nature/culture binary that Western law is built on. This 
destabilization fits closely to the deconstructive cultural politics as described by Fraser 
(1995). It contributed to transforming the underlying cultural-valuational structure by 
destabilising identities and our own understanding of what it means to be human.  
 
However, the court was not able to “recognize nature and the Other” in the relational 
perspective that the plaintiffs asked because the legal liberal tradition is unable to 
recognize indigenous relationship to land and nature other than through its own 
conceptions. This point is underlined by indigenous legal scholar Val Napoleon (2005) 
who explains that “The Court was not able to hear or accept the adaawk as presented – a 
legal and political institution rather than a simple cultural artefact or chronological 
history record. The forms of expression, symbolism, and inter-connections between the 
worlds of spirits, humans, and animals proved to be beyond the grasp of the trial judge”.  
 
For indigenous peoples in the settler colonial context, transformative redistributive 
remedies would go even further to confront the material conditions that they face within 
colonialism and would challenge western notions of property and distribution altogether. 
are forced to argue in courts that it is “their” land. What they cannot question within this 
system is the presumed relationship between peoples and land. That is, should land be a 
commodity to be controlled and owned by peoples?” 
 
5.3 Epistemic Justice 
 
Epistemic justice entails overcoming barriers for alternative forms of being and seeing 
the world to be recognized as valid and valuable knowledge and includes the even greater 
challenge of translating this into real policy and practice and social justice. 
 
For example, relational ontologies and a destabilization and reconceptualization of the 
nature-culture binary (Plumwood 2004) are increasingly finding a place in initiatives to 
imbue Mother Nature with rights such as in the Bolivian and Ecuadorean constitutions.  
Yet there remain considerable challenges in theory, policy and law to dissolving this 
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“ontological divide”5 and numerous tensions emerge in the translation of indigenous 
ethics of care into legal and policy frameworks, as several authors have documented in 
the case of rights of nature (Arsel 2012; Fish 2013).  
 
The integration of indigenous philosophies into hegemonic institutions can often lead to 
distortion, erasure and co-optation, a new form of epistemic extractivism and violence. 
For example, Widenhorn (2014) examined the mobilization of diverse actors of the 
concept of Buen Vivir, finding that the political act of translation served to transform 
“buen vivir into an object of knowledge detached from the knowledge holder.” Through 
this, “the inherently relational character of Andean cosmovision was lost… whereas 
modern rationality was reaffirmed.” She points to the gap between concept and reality 
and the tension between the need to make marginalized knowledges politically relevant, 
and the danger of erasing, co-opting and distorting these knowledge systems through the 
very act of doing so.  
 
On the other hand, Valladares and Boelens (2017) explore the rights of nature discourse 
as an “epistemic pact” that can serve as a tool for re-politicizing the environmental debate 
by challenging the dominant mono-cultural, functionalist and extractivist notion of 
nature, defined by capitalism and science.” They suggest that the political radicalism 
implied by this act of intercultural translation can lead to the creation of new alliances for 
territorial defense. 
 
This leads to the question of how the recognition and participation of nature that some 
scholars (Nussbaum 1997, Schlosberg 2007) have been claiming for can be done in an 
epistemically just way? Can public policy “translate” concepts such as rights of nature, 
indigenous self-determination, responsibility, into real justice? What are the limitations 
for these claims as tools of resistance and how can epistemic justice be enacted by those 
claiming it?  
 
                                                 
5
  See O’Neill (2006) for a discussion on The question of “who speaks for nature” for a discussion of  the political 
implications of representing nature’s interests as well as Castree’s (2003) discussion on moving towards a politics of politics of 
socionatural hybridity. 
28 
 
These questions would require more space to treat in depth, yet the case study suggests 
that moving towards epistemic justice requires on one hand, the opening up of concepts 
of nature and meaningful intercultural communication. The challenge for transformative 
epistemic justice here is not in translating indigenous concepts into terms comprehensible 
to liberal legal traditions but rather further developing through education, intercultural 
communication and listening, the interpretative “hermeneutical” resources to make sense 
of indigenous experience and perspectives. From here may emerge the possibility to 
transcend colonial and liberal constructs and open other worlds and other relationships 
with land, territory and nature.   
 
The Unist´ot´en enactment of epistemic justice rests on questioning the knowledge 
structures through which decisions are made themselves; and creating and asserting their 
own processes and practices relying on their own knowledge, language and ways of 
seeing and being the world. This includes both politics of refusal (Simpson 2014) as well 
as healing and sharing to transform the capacity of others to hear. Most importantly 
beyond discourse it involves action and lived practice.  
 
 
5.4 Beyond Recognition: Rights v. Geographies of responsibility  
 
These are not resources – these are life-forms that we have access to. Our laws are our 
responsibilities. The way we harvest salmon is our living law. 
- Unist'ot'en Camp 
 
The Unist’ot’en checkpoint demonstrates a very different approach to the politics of 
recognition. Instead of appealing outwards, its aim is to create a space for what Coulthard 
(2015) refers to as “self-recognition” and indigenous re-affirmation. In this newly 
reclaimed space, the Unist’ot’en camp members have been able to assert their own legal 
understandings, and to live their concept of justice through practice, through enactment 
and through antagonistic politics that disrupt the economic and social logic and 
production of settler colonial power.  
29 
 
 
The Unist’ot’en camp members reject a rights-based discourse that can only be accorded 
to them by what they perceive as an occupying power, and actively assert their 
responsibilities to the territory and their ancestral and natural law. According to the camp 
members, as warriors, they hold a sacred responsibility for all life in their territories. This 
is based on the concept of stewardship, whereby the warriors are managing the land 
because of their dependency on it, because of its intrinsic value as well as on behalf of the 
unborn future generations. Rather than speak about “rights” to fish they refuse to let their 
responsibility to the river to be diminished.  
 
This assertion of responsibility through active presence is premised on self-actualization, 
direct action and the resurgence of cultural practices through antagonistic politics. 
Environmental justice has always been about resistance, about continual repolitization of 
the environment, of redefining and expanding the concept of nature, and about 
reconnecting to place and territory. The space created by resistance camps such as the 
Unist’ot’en camp becomes a fervent space for transforming the collective imaginary and 
the hermeneutical capacity of the many visitors.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has drawn from the Delgamuukw case and the Unist´ot´en camp to challenge 
hegemonic theories of environmental justice and propose ones that can be mobilized for 
decolonization practices. Through examination of the Delgamuukw case, the possibilities 
and limits to recognition through the mechanisms of the state, as previously laid out by 
indigenous scholars (Muldoon 2005, Borrows 1999, Coulthard 2014) were outlined. In 
this paper a proposal for a decolonizing Environmental Justice in the settler-colonial 
context was put forward, based on the pillars of self-governing authority, the undoing of 
the ontology of land as property, and epistemic justice.  
 
"You may justly ask, as a white settler on stolen land, who are you to write about this? Or 
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to return to the fifth question of the protocol - how will my visit and this work benefit the 
Unist’ot’en? As a non-indigenous researcher, can this work contribute to actual and 
meaningful decolonization?  
 
The honest and somewhat uncomfortable answer is perhaps not much or not directly.  
Beyond the theoretical, this paper argues for the need for direct action and endeavors to 
prompt readers to take action. Camp members say that the camp is not a blockade, but 
instead a gateway to understanding truth and meaningful decolonization. This work aims 
to reflect my own journey through this gateway and my personal transformation, and the 
continuing unlearning and undoing of my own settler-colonial mentality. At the 
Unist´ot´en camp, I became more conscious of my own accountability as a settler and 
cognizant of concrete actions I could take in solidarity and support of the political goal of 
decolonization. On the Wedzin Kwa with the Unist´ot´en and their supporters, 
decolonization moved from the theoretical to a lived reality that appeared possible to 
achieve and actionable in the present. My aim is to contribute to building this imaginary.  
Decolonization calls for an abolition of property relations as we know them and a 
renewal of our relationship with nature. It would be uncomfortable and unsettling, but it 
is imperative. The question now is how to listen and how to learn from indigenous 
struggles such as the Unist´ot´en to assert our own responsibility as indigenous and non-
indigenous allies to make it happen. 
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